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ABSTRACT 
 
FOREIGN AID EFFICACY AND IMPLEMENTATION DELAYS: 
Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Financed Projects in Pakistan 
 
 
By 
 
Ibrahim, UZMA 
 
Recent debate of aid effectiveness and results of empirical studies show that 
traditional assumption of aid enhancing development does not sustain true unless aid is 
utilized proficiently. To assess aid effectiveness in Pakistan, ADB financed projects in 
Pakistan were compared with ADB-wide aid recipient countries. Results show that Pakistan 
has worst ‘Project Success rate’ over the last two decades and highest percentage of ‘Loans at 
risk’ among all. Inside Pakistan, ADB financed active projects (as of Dec 2010) comprised of 
twenty three (23) loans amounting $3.38 Billion (principal) with disbursement of $ 890 
Million (26.3%) out of $ 3.19 Billion (Net loans). The difference between principal and net 
loan amounting $190.0 Million (5.62%) was cancelled.  
This thesis hypothesizes that the critical way of utilizing foreign aid proficiently is to 
implement aid-financed projects efficiently. To test this hypothesis and investigate the causes 
of poor results of aided projects in the context of Pakistan, ADB-financed projects approved 
and implemented during 1999-2010 are analyzed for their implementation efficiency. Out of 
22 completed projects during the period, five were taken as a sample for a case study analysis 
to observe causes of its poor implementation. The results show indistinguishable reasons for 
the poor implementation leading unsuccessful projects. Given the resources (funds), lack of 
institutional capacity or ‘absorptive capacity’ of executing and implementing agencies is a 
due hurdle in achieving desired project results. Such institutional capacity can be associated 
to procedural delays at critical stages i.e. project start-up (long time taken for approval of 
project document and meeting of effectivity conditions by the government), weak 
coordination among stakeholders, over ambitious project design and unrealistic project 
interventions, insufficient focus on implementation and monitoring mechanism, poor 
administrative arrangements with deficient qualified staffing, poor commitment/interest or 
ownership and accountability by government. 
For successful project implementation, there is dire need to minimize above chronic 
delays. A complete and concise roadmap and timelines for all the activities should be 
prepared at the start of the project and meet accordingly with rigorous monitoring. To utilize 
aid effectively and to achieve developmental goals would not be helpful unless utilized in an 
organized manner using result based project management, building the local institutional 
capacities, and human resource management of the concerned agencies involved in project 
management.  
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Chapter I   Introduction  
 
 
 
Over several decades Pakistan has remained one of the main foreign aid 
receiving country in the world, but the economic indicators does not reflect 
improvement in the economic performance. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze 
foreign aided projects in Pakistan, highlight the issues related to the implementation and 
urge for a better strategy to execute such projects in a resourceful manner.   
 
Achievement of economic growth through foreign aid has always remained a 
debatable issue among economist over the past several decades. The concept of lending 
foreign aid was initiated after World War – II to reduce poverty but even after spending 
substantial number of years, poverty still remained as a harsh reality across the world. 
Many researches and policy analysts came up with variety of results on impacts of 
foreign aid on growth. Whether foreign aid can help a country to achieve its 
developmental goals or not is still questioned.  
 
Economic growth or development of a nation is constrained due to its limited 
resources i.e. inadequate domestic saving and lower level of foreign exchange reserves. 
This saving and investment gap can be filled with the help of foreign aid that at least in 
part generate enough physical capital to facilitate economic, environmental, social and 
political development of the recipients and accelerate the economic activity 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1940s, Chenery-Strout 1960s).  
 
The deliberate objective of the foreign aid is to support at least in part to help 
facilitate economic, environmental, social and political development of the recipients 
but the results do not really tell much about the aid-implications, as effectiveness of aid 
varies among recipient countries depending upon the policies they adopt. Countries 
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which achieved economic growth after receiving aid include South Korea and 
Botswana (1960’s), Indonesia (1970’s), Bolivia and Ghana (1980’s), Uganda, India and 
Vietnam (1990’s). Countries where foreign aid did not work or was a complete failure 
includes Zaire (DPR Congo now), Tanzania, Ethiopia, Niger, and Zambia etc (Dollar 
and David 1998).  
 
All aid is aimed for improving economic growth and reducing poverty for the 
nations. In addition to domestic saving, foreign aid supplements public investment and 
help to achieve productive growth. Foreign aid has remained very effective, somewhere 
in between or totally ineffective in different countries. Some nations could not achieve 
higher levels of growth despite receiving plenty of aid. Therefore, addition of capital 
might not be a decisive factor in aiming for higher growth, but the utilization of 
received aid. 
 
Aid can be effective in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty if it 
is utilized along with the coherent/sound policy practices (fiscal, monetary, trade, 
financial, labor policies), better economic (property rights/rule of law) and political 
(democracy/civil rights) institutions (Boone 1995). Impacts of aid vary among 
economies across the world as it is largely dependent on the public institutions and 
economic policies of the recipient governments (Burnside and Dollar 1997).  
 
Pakistan, like other capital-scarce nations relies heavily on international 
development aid from various individual governments (bilateral), and multilateral 
agencies. Pakistan is a major client with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as its 
portfolio covers ten sectors and thirty subsectors. In the recent years, ADB has almost 
80 active projects for Pakistan, which were three times larger than the World Bank, 
which has more international staff and three times more local staff than ADB in its 
resident mission. 
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In order to assess the aid effectiveness in Pakistan, ADB portfolio in Pakistan is 
analyzed and compared with ADB’s other aid recipient countries including India, 
Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, and 
Cambodia.  
 
     Fig 1 - Pakistan Country Comparison – ADB Project Success Rate   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
First analysis1 of ‘Project Success rate’ (Fig-I) over the past two decades 
reflected that it was worst in Pakistan among all countries (excluding Uzbekistan and 
Philippines in 1990s). Moreover, in 2000s for other countries success rate has improved 
(except Nepal and India), whereas for Pakistan it severely declined.  
 
Second analysis with respect to ‘Project loans at risk’ (Fig-II) showed that 
Pakistan has the highest percentage of loans at risk2 as compare to other countries. In 
the year 2009, at risk ratio was 21% which has declined a little in year 2010 but still 
highest. In case of India, Bhutan, Nepal and Cambodia, the risk ratio has either declined 
or no project at risk. In Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and Vietnam the project risk ratio has 
risen in year 2010 whereas at-risk-project in Indonesia has remained same in these two 
years. 
 
                                           
1 A detailed ADB wide country comparison table is at annex-I 
2 Projects rated unsatisfactory or considerable worse. 
 4 
 
 
Fig 2 - Pakistan Country Comparison – ADB Loans at risk (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADB has contributed a lot through various modalities of aid in Pakistan to 
improve the living standards and welfare of the humans, but realizing the expected 
outcomes through appropriate utilization of aid is still questioned. The above analysis 
suggests that given aid is not implemented properly and the desired development results 
are not achieved. 
 
Pronk’s (2001) argument on assessing aid explains that improvements in 
economic institutions and policies in the developing countries are the key change. A 
coherent policy with national development goals would impact the project execution 
procedures and help improve the overall aid performance. Like all developing nations, 
Pakistan lacks good policies and institutions to implement foreign aid (projects) to 
achieve desired results. Some of the apparent issues hampering the performance include 
lack of coordination among stakeholders, bureaucratic decision making processes, and 
inadequate management capacity of the executing agencies to implement the projects. 
Overall institutional capacity of public sector is another key factor producing poor 
results.  
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To analyze the causes the poor results of foreign aided projects in Pakistan, 
case study analysis of ADB financed projects, approved between the years 1999-2010 
and whose physical activities have been completed by the year 2010. There were 22 
total numbers of closed projects in the period, out of which five were taken as a sample 
for empirical analysis to see effects of foreign aid and causes of its poor implementation.  
 
In order to improve performance and achieve higher levels of growth, vigorous 
implementation of foreign aid is critical. It should be coherent with national 
development goals along with vigorous implementation at both individual and 
collective level i.e., partner donor, each government ministries, sponsoring, 
implementing or executing agencies. This leads towards a gradual strengthening of 
economic and political institutions. Thorough project management combined with the 
effective policy processes could result in better utilization of aid and a lot greater can be 
achieved. Otherwise foreign aid will remain ineffective and produce poor results - 
increasing debt burdens to economy.  
So my hypothesis here is that development aid provided through the means of 
local projects can achieve sustainable development results if it is executed effectively 
and efficiently. Therefore this thesis studies: 
– Are the ADB-financed projects in Pakistan implemented efficiently? 
– Why ADB-financed projects are delayed in implementation? What are 
the factors which cause time and cost over/under runs and hamper the 
project performance and overall aid utilization?  
– What effective measures can be taken to minimize these chronic delays, 
to overcome the implementation problems, and complete physical 
activities within time-frame? 
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The rest of study follows the sequence as: Chapter Two describes need of 
foreign aid in economic growth, its critical role, composition of foreign aid, and scheme 
of ADB portfolio in Pakistan. Chapter Three reviews the selected literature on foreign 
aid and its effectiveness with respect to implementation problems. Chapter Four 
describes methods of conducting analysis, development of hypothesis and basis for 
sample selection. Chapter Five presents the analysis of selected ADB-financed projects 
approved over twelve years as case studies. Chapter Six summarizes the critical issues 
at each project implementation stage, concluded with suggested measures to overcome 
the dismal delays and recommendations for effective project execution in future. 
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Chapter II   Foreign Aid in Pakistan 
 
 
Pakistan due to low resource mobilization domestically ‘capital-scarce nation’ 
relies heavily on international development aid. It has become a “donor driven” 
economy and certainly not “trade driven” one3. This chapter highlights the basic 
concepts of foreign aid, role of aid for Pakistan and its importance along with financial 
aid flows over the past years. It specifically demonstrates how the Asian Development 
Bank’s (ADB) assistance supports the poverty reduction agenda of the country using 
various modalities and funds with multi sectoral strategies. It also assesses the current 
portfolio health comparing indicators within country and ADB-wide. Project 
management issues related to handling foreign aided projects at each implementation 
stage of the project cycle and their implications have been presented. 
2.1 What is Foreign Aid? 
 
Foreign aid is ‘the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a 
country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its 
population’4. Aid provided to poor or developing countries has various objectives such 
as; aid provided as a moral or ethical responsibility to help the poor (Humanitarian aid), 
or to support strategic self interest of donor (Political) and to develop sound financial 
markets in benefit of both nations (Economic). The financial aid can be provided either 
through government (federal and local) called Official Development Assistance (ODA)5 
which aims to promote economic development and welfare of the recipient, or through 
capital market and private grants (private flows). 
                                           
3 Dr. Nadeem ul Haque, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission 
4 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Online 2012 
5 Include grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element 
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2.2 History of aid in Pakistan  
 
Being one of the largest aid recipients in the world, Pakistan receives almost 
US $3.5 Billion6 development assistance annually from various governments, bilateral 
and multilateral agencies. The ultimate aim of the copious aid is to meet the national 
developmental goals, and through improved physical infrastructure, and enhanced 
human capital. 
Pakistan receives various kind of aid i.e. nation tied aid to meet balance of 
payments shortage; project aid that is specific for a development project which cannot 
be transferred or shifted; technical assistance provided to enhance technical knowledge 
of entrepreneur and labour. Project loans (both concessional and non-concessional) are 
to finance the short term or long term projects depending upon the terms and conditions 
of the loan.  
 
Table 1–Concessional and Non Concessional Loan Commitments for the year 2010  
US $ (Million) 
Particulars Concessional loans 
Non-Concessional 
loans Total 
TOTAL 28,761 11,459 40,220 
i) MULTILATERAL 16,633 7,117 23,750 
     ADB 6,698 4,888 11,586 
     IBRD  1,722 1,722 
     IDA 9,569 208 9,777 
Other7 366 298 664 
ii) BILATERAL 12,128 4,342 16,470 
  a) Paris Club8 Countries 10,191 3,768 13,959 
  b) Non Paris Club9 Countries 1,937 573 2,511 
Source: Statistical Report 2010 - Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, GoP 
 
Some other forms include grant aid, commodity aid, and emergency relief 
which do not require the payment of principal and interest. See Annex-II for details. 
                                           
6 An annual aggregate of foreign aid received over the years 
7 EIB, IDB, IFAD, NORD. DEV. FUND, NORD. I. BANK, OPEC FUND 
8 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
9 China, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
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2.2.1 Foreign Aid Status 2010 
 
During the fiscal year 2009-10 projected disbursements from the foreign aid 
were $6,171 million, out of all 65.4% were from bilateral resources and 34.6% from 
multilateral sources in the shape of project aid and non-project aid. The total 
disbursements stood at $3,667 million. The project aid accounted for 98% of the total 
commitments. Total disbursement for the project aid amounted only $995.0 million 
(28% of the total disbursement). An amount of $1,169 million was disbursed for non-
project aid, (32% of total disbursements). The remaining $1398 million (40%) was 
disbursed for non-project aid such as earthquake rehabilitation, Afghan refugees, 
Internally Displaced Persons and Tokyo Pledges. 
The major difference in commitments and subsequent disbursement shows a 
large gap between economic resources available and its proper utilization raises a 
question of effective aid utilization. With limited resources how can aid give maximum 
benefits through improved mechanism? 
2.3 ADB assistance to Pakistan 
 
2.3.1 Foreign Aid flows  
 
Pakistan become ADB member in 1966, and has received largest aid both in 
number of loans and volume of assistance (amounting over $19.8 billion as of 
December 2010). Importance of ADB lending for Pakistan for poverty reduction agenda 
cannot be ignored. Being a largest development partner having highest number of 
projects undertaken as compared to other bilateral and multilateral donors.  
2.3.2 Financial Resources  
Financial resources of the Bank (except grants and technical assistance) 
comprise of Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR); and Special Fund (SF)/Asian 
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Development Fund (ADF) furnish funds on terms and conditions as presented in the 
table below:- 
Table 2 - Financial Resources of the ADB 
 
Type of Loan OCR10 Loan ADF11 Loan (SF) 
Maturity  15-25 years  Program Loans : 24 years Projects Loans : 32 years 
Grace Period  3-5 years  8 years  
Repayment Period  12-20 years 16-24 years 
Currency $, ¥, € $, ¥, £, € 
Interest Rate  LIBOR+0.20 BASIS POINTS  1% during grace period and 1.5% thereafter.  
Commitment charges  0.15% p.a.  -  
  Source: Financial Resources of Asian Development Bank - Website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Sector wise Breakup 
As of Dec 2010, ADB portfolio comprise of 30 developmental program and 
project loans with the total investment of $3.3 billion largely in the sectors of energy 
(27.76%), road and transport (32.14%), others include capital markets, technical 
education, urban sector development, SME development, agriculture, public 
administration and decentralization etc.  
Fig 3 – ADB Sector wise break-up of loans for Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Author calculations based on ADB-LFIS data 
                                           
10 Loans funded by market borrowings, capital subscriptions from member countries, and funds derived 
from ordinary operations. These loans have 12-20 years repayment period, with 0.15% commitment 
charges per annum and a variable LIBOR. 
11 Concessional funding through direct interest-free contributions from its donor members, having 16-24 
years repayment period with 1.5% interest rate per annum. 
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2.3.4 Fund wise Break-up 
Out of total 30 ADB assisted projects as of Dec 2010, 12 comprise of Ordinary 
Capital Resources, whereas 18 Asian Development Fund. In terms of number, OCR 
loans are less then ADF loans but in amount it comprises almost 70% of the total 
portfolio.  
 
Table 3 – Fund wise ADB’s Active portfolio Break-up 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB Loan Financial Information System (LFIS) 
 
For cumulative disbursement of the ongoing loans till 2010, ADF loan has 59 
percent disbursement whereas OCR loan has only 31.16 percent. Overall disbursements 
of both types of loans are also not satisfactory standing at 37.49 percent only.        
 
2.3.5 Portfolio Health 
Pakistan has one of the largest portfolios inside the ADB both in terms of 
number of loans as well as the amount of total financing available12. By the year Dec 
2010, its total portfolio comprise of 40 active13 loans ($4.2 billion) out of that 30 loans 
($3.3 billion) were ongoing. Its portfolio performance remains below the average of 
ADB-wide performance indicators with most ‘at risk’ projects.  
 
 
 
                                           
12 Quarterly Portfolio Performance Report – Asian Development Bank 2010 
13 Physical activities of the project completed but loan accounts awaiting closure. 
US$ Millions as of 2010 
Fund Amount  
committed 
Disbursement Disb. %age 
OCR 2,562.0 798.5 31.16 
ADF 750.3 443.4 59.09 
Total 3,312.4 1,241.9 37.49 
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The portfolio health comparison inside Pakistan and ADB-wide is presented in 
the following table:- 
Table 4 – Portfolio Health Comparison inside Pakistan and ADB Wide 
 
Source: ADB Quarterly Portfolio Performance Review (QPPR) report for Pakistan - 2010 
 
The most apparent and important cause of the unhealthy portfolio is 
implementation delays at almost all stages. Project start-up delays (late approval of 
project document), during implementation (late establishment of PMU, delayed 
appointment of consultants or contractors, and slow disbursements etc) and after project 
completion delays (closing of loan financial accounts) lead to increased cost and 
postponed benefits.  
 
2.4 Handling Foreign Aided Projects 
  
2.4.1 Project Cycle 
Foreign aided projects are executed under certain implementation stages 
starting from overall program details for the country and then specific project 
preparation till completion and evaluation.  
Government and the ADB along with all concerned stakeholders such as civil 
society, NGOs, private sector and other development partners devise a partnership 
strategy keeping in view the governments’ socio economic goals and ADB’s poverty 
                                           
14 ADB’s internal rating mechanism done automatically through a monitoring system   
 
Project Rating14 
% of Total Portfolio 
Pakistan ADB-wide 
Partly Satisfactory 16.7 5.1 
Potential Problem Project 0.0 6.1 
‘At Risk’ Project 23.8 7.5 
Unsatisfactory 7.1 1.2 
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reduction agenda. This partnership strategy paper is based on three to five years of 
mutual agreement on the achievement of developmental goals.   
Fig 4 – Project Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During second stage, field surveys, initial investigation or feasibility studies of 
projects are required. In Pakistan there is no special organization to investigate that, 
therefore projects are identified by respective ministries and departments, public sector 
corporations, NGO’s, pressure groups and public representatives. In some cases ADB 
also provide technical assistance and grants to help identify projects for future 
implementation. 
After the feasibility reports are submitted to government, Planning Commission 
appraises the projects whether they are technically sound, financially justified and 
viable for the economy. During project examination period, ADB also examines project 
feasibility with respect to technical, financial, environmental, economic, and 
management aspects and its potential social impact for the society. After careful 
examination of all the aspects and economic viability, a final decision is made whether 
or not to implement the project. 
Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
Identification/Prepration  
Implementation 
Evaluation 
Appraisal/Approval 
  
 
Completion/closure 
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Once the project is approved by ADB board, both Bank and government work 
out on loan agreement and project proposals in consultation with the concerned 
stakeholders, it is sent to government for its authorization. Following the project 
authorization by the Cabinet Division, loan is signed. ADB legal counsel and project 
officer review the conditionalities which have to be fulfilled by the project authority 
and declare project effectivity (within 90 days period). This follows the project 
implementation period and upon completion of all physical activities, it comes to 
financial closure of the loan. Post evaluation reviews are conducted jointly by the Bank 
and executing agency. Processes/procedures followed by ADB and government of 
Pakistan during project identification and preparation period are presented at annex-III. 
The project before its implementation takes three important stages including 
project approval by the board (Bank), signing (takes place within 90 days after 
approval) between donor and borrower, and affectivity (within 90 days after signing). 
This usual practice is significant for each project before its physical implementation is 
started by the executing agency. But in case of Pakistan this crucial stage is not taken 
with urgency and priority and most of the projects have to face chronic delays in this 
early stage, leading to project implementation delays over its life. This period fluctuates 
depending upon the policy conditions, and other details linked to each project. 
 
2.4.2 Stakeholder Involvement 
Project management is a complex process and involves efforts of various 
stakeholders during the project implementation period. Management process of foreign 
aided projects in Pakistan engage many stakeholders such as donor, federal 
governmental ministries, provincial government departments, sponsoring and executing 
agencies as well as the consultants and contractors etc.  
 15 
 
 
Fig 5 – Stakeholders involved during project implementation 
 
 
      
 
Source: Author  
 
Due to the involvement of many organizations, decision making and 
coordination problems arise and make it difficult to implement a certain project as per 
decided schedules. These inefficient time management and delays further enhance the 
cost of the project. A snapshot of handling official development assistance with various 
stakeholders is as follows:- 
 
  Fig 6 – Processes of Handling Foreign Aid among Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Author 
 
2.4.3 Project Management Issues 
Most of the development projects in Pakistan generally suffer due to issues 
such as delayed appointment of project team, transfers of team leader, lack of qualified 
professional and technical staff, a loose control over implementation schedules, lack of 
coordination between stakeholders, poor accountability, non compliance with the social 
and environmental safe guards, non-familiarity with the Banks’ procedures and 
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guidelines, and a complex decision-making process adds to the series of problems, 
critically affecting the project implementation. The project life cycle can be divided into 
four major phases for describing issues in more detail at each stage:- 
A. Project Readiness Stage 
Project readiness is before the project approval and signing period. Most of the 
projects suffer at this stage and some of the problematic issues such as lack of advance 
procurement action, reconciliation of project start; delayed preparation and approval of 
PC-115 by Central Development Working Party (CDWP)/ Executive Committee of 
National Economic Council (ECNEC); inefficient process of consultants’ 
appointment/procurement; inefficient system of appointment of key project staff and 
installation of Supervision consultants; projects components and their outputs are overly 
ambitious and unattainable; non-availability of counterpart funding i.e. allocation of 
sufficient funds for land acquisition and resettlement plan.  
 
B. Project Implementation Stage 
During the implementation stage, projects usually suffer due to delayed 
appointment of Project Management Unit (PMU) staff and frequent transfer of Project 
Directors and key PMU staff. In-efficient mechanism of procurements as per ADB’s 
guidelines, and lose control over implementation schedules also add to the troubles. 
Lack of coordination among implementing agencies and contractors mainly due to 
involvement of many stakeholders becomes crucial to keep project implementation on 
track. 
 
                                           
15 PC-I is essential for securing government counterpart funds and for project implementation timelines. 
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C. Project Monitoring and Evaluation Stage 
During the project implementation period, monitoring and evaluation plays an 
important role to streamline the project activities as per schedule if they do not follow 
the track. But there is a lack of meaningful/strict project monitoring system as well as 
noncompliance with ADB’s Procedures and Guidelines especially in the areas of 
environmental and social monitoring of the projects. No proper monitoring mechanism 
for consultant’s contribution and its performance reviews. Due to all the above issues, 
follow up of the original plan of the project prepared by the executing agency duly 
approved by the CDWP/ECNEC is merely tracked. 
 
D. Project Completion Stage 
Once the project completes its physical activities, it comes to completion stage 
where unutilized loan amount is refunded to the Bank by project authority. Even at this 
stage project authorities face inefficient processing of the outstanding loan to the     
Bank which leads to adding interest charges as well as lowering the project rating.  
Above all, ADB projects in Pakistan have faced serious implementation delays 
over the past several years, which have affected the pace of the projects throughout its 
life resulting in loan extensions and poor physical activities. These implementation 
delays lead towards un-attained goals, increase cost and time and most importantly 
affecting the development results negatively. The thesis will assess the related project 
issues and find causes of the important problems in order to take action against those 
stymied problems for a better project implementation. 
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Chapter III  Literature Review 
 
 
Foreign aid is supposed to spur the economic growth and help enhance 
transformation process of the recipient developing country. The volume of foreign aid 
received in a country tells an important linkage - higher the level of foreign aid 
presumed to enhance the growth in long run. The role of foreign aid is of extreme 
importance as intended to improve economic growth and achieve national 
developmental goals16.  
Analyzing the theoretical linkages between foreign aid and economic growth 
provides a foundation for future research and allows researchers and policy makers to 
confirm this link through examining it empirically. The existing literature is divided 
into three parts; one studies the effects of foreign aid on economic growth of aid 
receiving nations where aid was effective, completely ineffective or effective under 
certain conditions. The other part investigates the unfulfilled conditions that lead to aid 
ineffectiveness or policy conditions that ensure aid effectiveness. The last part explains 
results of various research studies conducted to capture the effects of foreign aid on 
economic growth in case of Pakistan as well as efforts to align the national development 
policies with foreign aid.  
Over the years, history shed light on three types of literature on aid and its 
effectiveness. The very conventional views expressed by Freedman (1958), Bauer 
(1972), Boone (1996), and Easterly (2008) that aid is merely helpful in economic 
growth. It only expanded the bureaucratic organizations, corruptions and enriches the 
elite. In many agriculture economies recipient countries fall in the trap of Dutch disease. 
                                           
16 Such as improvement in physical infrastructure, enhance capabilities of human capital and achieve 
higher levels of economic growth. 
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Aid is ‘neither a sufficient’ ‘nor necessary’ condition for development as it is totally 
ineffective for the economic growth or wellbeing of its people (Thorbecke 2000). When 
government serves particular interest groups (Boone 1996) or rent seeking behaviour of 
some groups i.e. corruption, aid could not help to improve human development and 
poverty reduction agenda. 
The second type of literature considers that though aid does not have same 
effects everywhere but on average there is a positive impact on growth. Development in 
the poor countries is hampered either by domestic savings or foreign exchange 
constraints on physical capital can be relieved by aid (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1940s 
Chenery-Strout; 1960s). Such insufficient capital formulation (saving-investment gap or 
low foreign direct investment) can be eliminated with the help of foreign aided capital 
investment in infrastructure lead towards economic development (Harrod-Domar 1940s, 
50s).  
The reasons why aid is effective in some countries and not in others gives an 
idea that what makes aid more effective and what cause its ineffectiveness. The shift in 
development strategies of the donors and recipients, a new approach for aid allocation 
and implementation has also evolved with passage of time. Economic growth of a 
country depends on technological advancement and productivity growth (Schumpeter, 
Solow, Schultz, Becker 60s, 70s) therefore; aid should be allocated for human capital 
augmentation such as research and development and education, which have spillover 
effects or positive externalities; better rules/institutions (Romer 1986) as well as 
technological development.  Such transfer of income ‘aid’ stimulates the long-run 
productivity (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2004) but with increased project aid, 
effects on growth diminish with passage of time (Cassen et all 1986). 
Later on during 1990s, and 2000s, aid supported policy reform and institutional 
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strengthening of the recipient countries being important factors for its effectiveness and 
achieving long term economic growth. Direct aid investments in building infrastructure,  
roads, irrigation, power, ports has strong positive effects on growth in short run whereas 
indirect aid for the education, health, democracy, and environmental protection has also 
positive but weak effects on growth taking place over a long time. Clemens, Radelet, 
and Bhavnani (2004) argued that though both kind of aid sooner or later effects the 
economic growth but it is more effective in countries with good policies/institutions and 
human capital.    
 These sound macro policies include fiscal, monetary, trade, financial, labor, 
etc (Burnside and Dollar 2000); good political institutions i.e. democracy/civil liberties 
(Isham, Kaufmann, Pritchett 1995); and economic institutions i.e. property rights/rule of 
law (Dollar and Collier 2000). World Bank (1998) highlighted that not all aid improves 
growth or help to reduce poverty level as its effectiveness solely relies on the sound 
economic management (policies and institutions) of the recipient governments. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) states that aid is more effective when targeted to 
countries with sound institutions/policies and higher levels of poverty.  
Economic growth of a developing country largely relies on institutional and 
policy distortions, foreign aid, and aid interacted with distortions.  Foreign aid with 
respect to environment17 showed positive impact for countries with better environment 
(political stability, physical infrastructure, government responsibility, institutional 
capacity, human capital and effective coordination mechanism) have achieved 
improved results (Burnside and Dollar 2000 and Collier and Dollar 2002). Such effects 
of foreign aid can be much greater than direct effects of policies themselves have on 
growth. 
                                           
17 Narrowly means sound monetary, fiscal and trade related policies. 
 21 
 
 
Cross-country regressions by Dollar (1997) explained that aid is effective when 
provided to the countries having competent bureaucracy, trade openness, and strong 
rule of law. Aid effectiveness will enhance with the donors, who focus on poor 
countries having better policies and institutions then those distorted economies (Boone; 
1996). One percent of GDP in assistance translates into a 1 per cent decline in poverty 
but favoring countries with sound economic management (Pronk; 2001).  
Current aid allocations are inefficient with respect to reducing poverty as 
targeted to countries having less poverty and weak policy environments. Collier and 
Dollar (2000) compared aid allocations to the world with the allocation that could 
maximize the aid impact to reduce poverty. They argued that use of ‘poverty efficient’ 
allocation of aid would be very much effective for the policy makers and will lead 
towards poverty reduction in the low income countries.  
The results presents that existing allocation of aid to world can lift 10 million 
people out of poverty annually but with efficient economic policies in the recipient 
countries, the number could be doubled. It is obvious that policies which are helpful to 
improve growth are equally effective in poverty reduction and in bad policy 
environment aid would be ineffective in inducing policy reform or growth. Therefore 
aid should be allocated to the countries having large amounts of poverty but with 
efficient economic policies. 
For aid allocation, Burnside and Dollar (2000) also analyzed lending patterns of 
bilateral and multilateral donors and found that only multilateral donors lend aid with 
respect to income level, population, and policy environment of the country. The results 
indicate that almost one third of multilateral aid allocated is in favour of good policies. 
Until middle of 1990’s donors did not consider better policy environment for allocating 
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aid but if do so, aid can help improve the policies of the recipient countries as well as 
overall growth.  
Foreign aid through local development projects are powerful tool to stimulate 
the performance of individual sectors through employment generation, reducing poverty 
and improving growth levels. Such projects are intended for the development of entire 
public sector; and with improved institutions and policies, public sector can deliver 
services effectively. Hence, policies and institutions are the key for improvement.  
Projects are complex in nature and implementing agencies need unique 
requirements in terms of management capacity to gain the desired outcomes.  
Williams (1995) analyzed quantitative and qualitative impacts of project delays causing 
increased cost. Three important implementation delays identified include changes to the 
design, document approval delays and extra (invalid) comments. Project extensions 
during the project timelines cause significant disruptions which should be avoided 
unless the extra resources are available to the project. Several mechanisms such as 
learning lessons from one project problems and exploring reasons to failure, adapting 
the changes, and revise the interpersonal structures throughout the organization for 
future project success have become essential (Williams 1995, 2003). 
‘Coordination failure’ among donor and recipient mainly occurs because of 
strategic and historical considerations of aid allocations. In many cases it favors few 
priority sectors, while neglecting low priority but important sectors leading to aid 
fragmentation18 and increasing cost (Acharya 2006). The incomplete information about 
priorities among government levels, sectors, regions, and with other donors causes 
coordination problems and aid ineffectiveness (Akatwijuka 2007).  
 
                                           
18 On average 26 multilateral and bilateral donors operates in each developing country. 
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It is mere responsibility of public sector to utilize scarce resources at maximum 
while coordinating with inter-organizations 19  and intra-organizations 20  across 
governments to build strong relationships and achieve intended outcomes (Painter 1987; 
Head 1996; Bridgman and Davis 1998). Government can play a viable role in 
exercising authority (O’Grady 1985) and central in managing external and internal 
implementation and operation aspects (Mitchell and Shortell 2000). This will help 
establishing smooth decision making rules, active leadership, exchange of information, 
shared obligation, decision making process (Lie 2011) as well as in realizing the 
coherent policies and programs (Brown 2002).  
Wepenhans (1992) highlighted project issues causing project failures and 
hindering performance at various implementation stages after reviewing 1800 projects 
in 113 countries with World Bank’s total lending of US $138 Billion. The failure was 
associated to gigantic problems needed to be identified and addressed as cost of bearing 
such poor performance was higher for borrowers. The project factors and country 
factors associated to such failures are as follows:-  
At borrowers side poor understanding of Bank’s policies, procedures and 
requirements along with poor capabilities and practices i.e. bidding process leads to 
take extensive use of time and resources. Another hurdle was project by project 
limitations, which are usually sector, region and project specific. The issues identified 
from one project with proposed solutions can be generalized and implemented to all 
projects.  
 
 
                                           
19 Between various diverse natured organizations. 
20 Within an organization. 
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At the project level, the problems are poor coordination with stakeholders, lack 
of managerial and technical capabilities to implement project – project management 
authority has little or no experience of accounting, procurement, management and 
environmental impact assessment. Reduction in the scope of project, poor contractor 
performance, inadequate institutional and organizational structures, and to audit 
managerial decisions also results in poor project performance. 
At country level, the problems are: macroeconomic policies and conditions, 
continuously changing development priorities, deficient regulatory environment, lack of 
organizational or institutional capacities of the local institutions, lack of ownership and 
commitment, financial constraints, and change in institutional environments. These 
problems have significant direct or indirect effects on the project performance. 
Borrowers were dissatisfied with portfolio management practices of the Bank: 
inexperienced staff in project management, excessive duration of headquarters review, 
giving more priority to lending and approval process then focusing on implementation. 
Once the project gets approved by the board, Task Managers have little or no time to 
cater the borrower’s requirements in the project start-up. ‘Project staff appeared more 
driven by pressure to lend then a desire for successful project implementation’. 
Non-compliance on various covenants especially related to financial, 
accounting and audit covenants was a serious issue among borrowers, but any remedy 
such as stoppage of withdrawals was rarely exercised. Project conditions applied are not 
in-lined with the political realities of the borrowing country as well as insensitive 
towards the economic policies undertaken for structural adjustments. Country 
partnership strategy papers do not reflect anything related to lessons learnt and further 
strategy to cope those issues vis-à-vis follow-up on the implementation problems was 
also very low. Derivation of lessons from the past experiences with respect to project 
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design, methodology adopted, and implementation plan provides basis for future 
changes in the policy and practices but nothing such was specified at any stage. 
There is also a lack of feedback provided to project staff from the senior/higher 
management or signals on good or bad performance. The incentive mechanism is very 
much desirable in brining the change in attitudes and behaviors. Provision of timely 
feedback is important in order to identify and address general and thematic problems on 
various types of projects and keep on improving the concepts, designs, policies and 
procedures according to the changing environment. 
Wepenhans recommended that benefits of the projects should be sustainable 
and on the ground. The Bank should focus more on implementation of the project then 
lending more. Local ownership of the project should be focused from loan approval to 
implementation. Borrowers should be committed to implement the loan, utilizing their 
full resources and handling the issues in timely manner. Both should focus on result 
oriented implementation of the project with rigorous monitoring and evaluation at each 
and every stage of the project to avoid time and cost over-runs. 
Performance should be taken into account with extreme importance and an 
internal environment supportive of better portfolio performance should be established. 
‘One size fits all’ approach is unrealistic therefore; prime focus of country 
implementation reviews should be to improve portfolio performance and address the 
project by project generic but important issues. Trainings on making financial 
statements, accounting and auditing arrangements and project management issues 
should be imparted to staff dealing project activities. Wepenhans proposed that ‘faster 
completion of the negotiation, reduced elapsed time between approval and effectivity’ 
and ‘borrower’s commitment and ownership’ will lead towards project success. 
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In Pakistan state of aid utilization in an efficient manner is at early stages and a 
lot is still required to be done in order to define and align the national development 
policies with foreign aid. Since development is not much confined to government sector 
and new key players such as local organization, private sector and international 
development partners have their new specified role in development process.  
Research conducted to analyze the relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth in case of Pakistan include Chisti and Hasan (1992) concluded that 
foreign aid through grants has impacts on public investment but for loans the effect was 
insignificant. Rahim and Khan (1993) found negative relation between foreign aid and 
domestic resource mobilization but with positive impacts on growth. Khan (1997) 
showed that foreign aid and debt has negative effects on economic growth whereas 
Iqbal (1997) and Ghulam (2005) argued though official aid executed through public 
projects has strong impact on society and it helped improve the growth, and assisted 
poverty reduction but added to debt burdens (Ishfaq 2004).  
Such mixed results about aid effectiveness explain that foreign aided 
development projects are not implemented properly and limited project performance 
refrain from achieving the national development goals. The portfolio performance is 
deteriorated mainly because of poor design, poor management and implementation. 
Most of the projects face severe problems during implementation. The loan cancellation 
rate is also high due to inadequate capacity of the executing agencies to implement 
ambitious projects. Seeking project extensions to complete physical activities is rising 
mainly because of time consumed at the project approval and effectiveness stage is 
much longer then estimated. Actual project completion time estimated at approval stage 
increased by almost two years or more. There are a lot of institutional constraints such 
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as shortage of counterpart funding, poor project management, technical deficiencies, 
and defective procurement techniques etc. 
Keeping in view the institutional and technical deficiencies many international 
donor development agencies have been highlighting the need to streamline project 
processes in Pakistan. At international level, ADB provided a technical assistance (in 
2004) to Pakistan to streamline procedures to reduce implementation delays of the 
development projects. It was a very effective study and somewhat very first attempt to 
highlight project specific issues. Although the study could not be completed due to its 
ineffective implementation and unnecessary delays but it did highlight some of the 
systemic and casual factors affecting project performance. It helped in identifying 
missing links in official procedures and time frames involved in project management 
practices in Pakistan. UNDP undertook a Preparatory Study regarding the formulation 
of a Foreign Assistance Policy Framework for Pakistan (2005). The study was useful in 
pointing out main procedural bottlenecks.  
At national level, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of Pakistan 
organized international conferences under the banner of Pakistan Development Forum 
(PDF) with development partners on harmonization and aid effectiveness in 
development projects. The PDF 2010 Report was of great significance as it hinted on 
the futuristic need of framework of systems in project management. This call for reform 
for improved structure of governance in projects was supported by the development 
sector stakeholders.  
Research done by Husain (2008) on ‘Business Process Review for Result 
Based Management’ raised the point that public investment needs careful 
implementation skills. Ikram (2011) continued the same debate in his work 
‘Revitalizing Planning Commission’. Pasha (2011) has contributed his vision in his 
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Analytical Review of PSDP and this Planning Commission Report clearly sends the 
message that government is cognizant of need assessment in the sector. All these 
researches seem valid but how to proceed forward is the big question.  
Pakistan being capital scarce economy relies on foreign aided development 
projects whereas effective utilization and proper implementation of these projects is the 
biggest challenge. The apparent delays during implementation, huge cancellation 
amounts, as well as cost and times over runs necessitate for an in-depth analysis of the 
real causes of the issues associated with the development portfolio in Pakistan. Being a 
largest development partner and multilateral donor, significance of ADB portfolio for 
Pakistan’s economy cannot be ignored. Keeping in view the important role of its 
development schemes in Pakistan, this thesis investigates the causes of implementation 
delays with the help of project case studies. The results will highlight the systemic and 
causal project issues with improving project based interventions with the help of 
realistic solutions for effective aid utilization.  
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Chapter IV    Methodology 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three discusses the results of evaluating the impact of significant 
implementation delays of foreign aided projects affecting the performance in Pakistan. 
The empirical investigations on impact of foreign aid in this chapter will provide further 
insights of these relationships. The chapter follows the sequence as, development of 
hypothesis, methodology of testing the hypothesis, reasons of conducting the case study 
analysis and the basis of sample selection.  
ADB has assisted Pakistan to improve its critical economic and governance 
reform during the past few decades. Since its membership in 1966, ADB has provided 
funds through various modalities including project loans, program loans (budgetary 
support), Technical Assistance, and Sector loans. The detail of each loan is given in the 
Table-5 with respect to principal amount, amount cancelled, net loan amount and 
percentage disbursements. From 1966 till year 2010 out of total 16.72 Billion USD 
portfolio, 14.13 Billion USD was disbursed (2.58 Billion USD was cancelled because 
of various reasons associated to each project).  
 
 Table 5 - Total Portfolio and Disbursement 
 Principal Cancelled Net Loan % Disb 
Project 6,599,484 1,523,111 5,076,373 76.92 
Program 7,808,032 369,853 7,438,179 95.26 
TA 154,030 114,227 39,803 25.84 
Sector 2,161,419 580,884 1,580,535 73.12 
Total 16,722,965 2,588,075 14,134,890 84.5 
   Source: ADB, LFIS database 
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Considering with respect to modalities, it is obvious that largest disbursement 
can be found with program loans (95.26%), whereas project loans (76.92%) , Sector 
(73.12%) and least disbursement was found in Technical Assistance loans (25.84%). 
Although ADB has provided various kinds of modalities over the years, but only 
Project Loans have been taken into consideration for the current analysis. Modalities i.e. 
sector loans, program loans and technical assistance were excluded having different 
terms and conditions associated with each. Details of each Project Loan with respect to 
its principal amount, amount cancelled, net loan and percentage disbursement in a 
detailed table as well as graphical presentation is presented at Annex-IV. 
4.1 Hypothesis Development 
 
ADB’s active portfolio by the end 2010 (include all four types of modalities 
mentioned above) comprise of twenty three (23) loans amounting $3.38 Billion 
(principal) with disbursement of $ 890 Million (26.3%) out of $ 3.19 Billion (Net loans). 
The difference between principal and net loan amounting $190.0 Million (5.62%) was 
cancelled. Projects with such unsatisfactory performance may have various causes. 
However, the implementation delays can cause the most important and critical effects 
on the performance of the project.  
To identify whether ADB-financed project in Pakistan also suffered from such 
implementation delays or not, the following hypothesis has developed. 
ADB-financed projects in Pakistan suffered due to lack of 
i. Good Preparation and Planning (initial delays) 
ii. Ownership and Commitment (decision making delays) 
iii. Qualified personnel and institutional capacity (management inefficiencies) 
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4.2 Methodological Framework 
 
 A test of the hypothesis is based on a Case Study analysis of ADB-financed 
projects approved during the last twelve years (1999-2010) whom physical activities 
were completed within that time-frame. The study will only focus on the ADB’s project 
loans comprising of Hard Loans (short-term loans for fifteen to twenty-five years with 
no concessional element) and Soft Loans (long term loans usually for twenty four to 
thirty-two years with concessional elements). 
 Along with a case study analysis, in depth interviews were also carried out in 
order to obtain important information and feedback from stakeholders involved during 
various stages of project implementation. These include professionals from 
development sector, officers from federal and provincial ministries, and project 
directors who highlighted the real factors damaging project performance. Their 
observations and opinion helped finalize the number of harmful aspects and suggestions 
to improve portfolio performance for future development projects. Their view point of 
these stakeholders about the implementation processes and problems associated at all 
levels were given a due weighting in the analysis and conclusion part of this paper.  
4.2.1 Basis for Sample Selection  
 
There were twenty two (22) 
closed projects during that time frame 
include Road and transport, Health, 
Education, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Urban Sector development, 
Irrigation drainage and flood protection, 
Finance Sector development, and SME 
development sectors. 
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The sample of five (05) projects was selected out of twenty two closed projects 
depending on the percentage share in the total portfolio. Some of the project loans were 
excluded from the analysis as they were cancelled without making any disbursement 
including Irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector loan. Process of selecting 
sample project incorporate two methods i) Sectoral Distribution (seven sectors), and ii) 
Fund wise Distribution (70% ADF and 30% OCR). 
 The selected five loans comprise of Four (04) sectors (Health, Education, 
Agriculture, and Road Transport) and include three (3) ADF (60%) and two (2) OCR 
(40%) loans, which represent the total portfolio fairly well in terms of both the number 
of projects and the amount in each sector. Specific detail of each project including its 
sector and fund wise share is presented below:- 
Sr. No. Sector Total Projects Sample Project Loan No. (Type) 
1 Health 2 1 1900 (ADF) 
2 Education 3 1 2133 (ADF) 
3 Agric & Rural  3 1 1787 (ADF) 
4 Road Transport21 7 2 1892 (OCR) 
1928(OCR) 
 
The sectors such as Urban Sector Development (4), Irrigation drainage and 
flood protection (1), Finance Sector development (1), and SME development (1) were 
not included in the analysis. Out of 4 of the projects from Urban Sector Development 3 
projects faced advance closure due to non-compliance.  
To identify implementation delays and their core causes in order to resolve and 
improve overall project performance, a detailed case study analysis is conducted against 
ADB-financed sample project in the following chapter. The results of this analysis will 
be helpful in recognizing the issues associated with ADB-financed projects and also to 
map out a way forward for future implementations. 
                                           
21 Road and Transport Sector Loans are taken from province Punjab, and Sindh. (excluded KP because of 
security situation) 
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Chapter V   Case Study Analysis 
Each case study comprises of some basic information about project such as 
project title, its location, thematic area, sponsoring and implementing agency(s); main 
objectives/outcomes of the project; mode of financing (whether it is financed through 
OCR or ADF funds as well as their terms & conditions); implementation milestone 
dates; the net loan amount, financial releases such as projected and actual 
disbursements and cancellations; and lastly the important issues pertinent to each 
project appeared during project implementation.  
5.1 Case Study Indicators 
 
The case study analysis is conducted on the five indicators based on Projects’ 
achievement of Milestone Dates; Financial Releases; Special Review Missions; Overall 
Performance; and Relevance of Project Design and Formulation. The detailed 
description against each indicator is as follows:- 
Indicators  Detailed Description 
Milestones 
dates  
Milestone dates include the key date a project need to catch-up to ensure 
that its activities are on track such as loan approval, signing, effectivity, 
completion and closing. 
Financial 
Releases  
Financial releases include the actual disbursements against estimated 
disbursements each year and total disbursement of the project against the 
net loan amount estimated at appraisal.  
Bank Review 
Mission  
  
Special Review mission fielded by the Bank (how often and at what stage 
of the project) and what were the outcomes and measures taken against 
issues identified.  
Overall 
Performance  
The overall performance of the project to know whether physical outputs 
and projected outcomes at the project preparation stage were achieved or 
not. 
Relevance of 
Project and 
Design  
 
Relevance of the project with respect to government of Pakistan’s poverty 
reduction agenda as well as Bank’s country partnership strategy. The 
desired goals were attained or not, and effects of project design on overall 
project performance. 
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Information for the case study analysis was mainly excerpted from project 
completion reports from the executing agencies, evaluation reports compiled by the 
ADB, portfolio performance reviews conducted jointly by the ADB and Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Statistics along with the informal interviews from pertinent 
stakeholders by the author.  
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CASE STUDY - I 
Project (Loan No.) Reproductive Health (1900) 
Location Federal, NWFP, Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab provinces 
Thematic Area Health, Nutrition, and Social Protection 
Sponsoring Agency Ministry of Health 
Implementing Agency M/O Health and M/O Population Welfare & Provincial Health Departments. 
Objectives/Outcomes 
The project had a dual objective of:- 
(a) increasing the use of reproductive health services in 34 poor and underserved 
districts, and (b) strengthening the sector capacity for reproductive health 
services in the context of the government’s restructuring process. 
Mode of Financing  Asian Development Fund (ADF), Special Fund (SF) 
Terms & Conditions 
Repayment Grace Period Interest 
32 yrs 8 yrs 1% p.a during GP & 1.5% thereafter 
 
  
Milestone Dates 
Board Approval Signing Effectivity Closing  Revised Closing  
20-12-2001 20-03-2002 
20-03-2003 
20-06-2002 
24-02-2004 
31-12-2007 30-06-2008 
18-08-2009 
 
Net Loan Amount US$ 5,678 million  
Financial Releases  
(US$ Million) 
Principal Amount Cancelled Disbursement  
44,072 38,394 5,678 
 
 
 
 
Profile of  
Disbursement 
 
 
 
 
Issues during 
implementation  
– weak institutional commitment and capacity 
– lack of stakeholders coordination 
– late establishment of PCU 
– no project administration manual was prepared 
  
 
U
S 
$ 
M
ill
io
ns
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Discussion on Project ‘Reproductive Health’ (1900) 
 
1. Milestone Dates 
The project was initially designed to implement within 6 years (July 2002 to 
Dec 2007). ADB Board approved the loan on 20 December 2001 but due to inability of 
the executing agencies to secure Government approval for PC-I Form22, loan signing 
took place on 20 March 2003, exactly one year later than the planned date. The loan 
becomes effective on Feb 2004 instead of 20 June 2003 (a delay of eight months) 
because of non establishment of PCU. Though the Project completion report (PCR) or 
any other project document does not explain why PC-I approval and establishment of 
PCU was delayed but it clearly shows the lack of Government commitment, lack of 
management capacity at federal and provincial level to put these into place. 
Despite initial delays in the project the closing date of Dec 2007 was 
maintained. The PCUs and PIUs were established by early 2006 - four years after 
project approval, and less than two years before the closing date. With barely two years 
to catch up with the delays in implementation, project achieved 30% of its physical 
targets and spent only 18.8% of the estimated total project cost. The loan closing date 
was extended twice and loan account was closed on Dec 2010. Though the project has 
more or less same six years of implementation as planned at appraisal but project 
implementation was seriously jeopardized. 
 
 
2. Financial Releases 
A critical element for successful project implementation, PCUs was established 
after four years, therefore, many activities could not be carried out in time. At loan 
closing the project used only $8.44 million (18.8%) out of of the $45 million estimated; 
about 86% of the original loan was cancelled due to the implementation delays. The 
                                           
22 PC-I is essential for securing government counterpart funds and for project implementation. 
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first disbursement was made on 28 January 2005 and the final disbursement on 18 
August 2009. Disbursement was low in the first 3 years of project implementation (6% 
against an elapsed period of 62%), but increased somewhat after all the PCU was 
established by early 2006. Especially, starting from 2004 the pace of disbursement was 
faster than originally planned at appraisal. 
 
3. Bank Review Mission 
Despite numerous issues and pertinent delays in the very beginning of the 
project ADB did not call any serious attention to executing agencies. Only one loan 
review mission - an year after the loan declared effective was fielded (February 2005) 
to oversee project implementation. The second review mission (July 2006) could not be 
completed because of some personal emergency of one of the loan mission members. 
ADB’s internal monitoring system did not trigger any warning until 2007, and then it 
was too late to compensate for the problems faced by project. 
 
4. Overall Performance 
The project achieved only 30% of its physical targets and could not perform 
well in almost all components. The PCR rated it ‘unsuccessful’ project as it was ‘partly 
relevant, highly structured, ambitious, unrealistic, ineffective and unlikely to be 
sustained’ that leads to un-fulfilment of the policy objectives to be achieved through 
this project. 
Most of the problems associated with the project could have been mitigated. 
Delayed approval of PC-I, non-establishment of PCU, unqualified staff etc were not 
new and already anticipated in the PC-I. Intermediate technical assistance could have 
provided by ADB to help set up PCU and train staff, or hired more qualified staff. 
Government could have coordinated with key stakeholders (executing/implementing 
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agency officers) to work-out preliminary activities and ensure the project requirements 
i.e. adequate counterpart funds, imprest account.  
 
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
Despite its significance and relevance to Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan 
(PRSP) of Government and ADB’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), the project 
performance was considerably eroded due to its “complex and ambitious design” 
implementation structure with 52 entities involved in day-to-day work management. 
None of the project staff was hired according to project design. Quality of civil works 
was not upto the standards mainly because of the industry norm and failure of project 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Project design failed to ensure implementing 
capacity and none of government and ADB project staff initiate any action to remedy 
such perennial problems. Given institutional constraint, a simple implementation 
mechanism or project design could have been made. Necessary mitigation measures 
could have built in project design keeping in view the potential implementation risks.  
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CASE STUDY-II 
Project (Loan No.)  Restructuring of Technical Education & Vocational Training System (2133) 
Location Balochistan Province 
Thematic Area Technical Education 
Sponsoring Agency(s) 
Education Department, Govt. of Balochistan. 
Labor & Manpower Department, Govt. of Balochistan. 
Provincial C& W Department for Civil Works. 
Implementing Agency Planning & Development Deptt. Govt. of Balochistan 
Objectives/Outcomes 
Improve quality and relevance of TEVT programs through more equitable access 
to better quality programs, with focus on females and rural poor, enhanced 
employability of graduates, and enhanced institutional efficiency of key TEVT 
institutions.  
Mode of Financing   Asian Development Fund        
Terms & Conditions 
Repayment Grace Period Interest 
32 yrs 8 yrs 1% p.a during GP & 1.5% thereafter 
 
  
Milestone Dates 
Board Approval Signing Effectivity Closing  Revised Closing  
14-12-2004 22-03-2005 22-06-2005 
23-08-2005 
30-04-2011 24 May 2010 
 
Net Loan Amount US$ 22.9 million (17.5 ADB + 5.4 GoP) 
Financial Releases  
(US$ Million) 
Principal Amount Cancelled Disbursement  
16,152 12,105 4,047 
 
Profile of Disbursement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues  
– Incoherent and unstructured implementation. 
– Weak institutional capacity and coordination problems among stakeholders. 
– Overambitious, unrealistic interventions with complex project design. 
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Discussion on Project ‘Restructuring of TEVT System’ (2133) 
 
1. Milestone Dates 
The project was initially scheduled for the period of six years (June 2005-April 
2011). The loan was signed on March 2005 and become effectiveness on 23 Aug 2005. 
Balochistan is an underdeveloped province with difficult social, cultural, political and 
economic conditions as well as weak institutional capacity of the government 
departments. The fundamental difference between expectations and implementation 
realities, such unrealistic and over ambitious natured project become difficult to 
implement.  
Project was based on assumptions which do not fit the local culture. Weak 
capacity and lack of coordination between stakeholders, discrepancies between ADB 
project document (RRP) and government (PC-I), unrealistic cost estimates and overly 
designed civil works structures, incoherent and unstructured implementation lead 
towards slow and unsatisfactory progress. Considering project was ineffective and 
unlikely to be sustainable, government requested ADB to cancel un-utilized amount of 
loan and move the loan closing date forward, from April 2011 to May 2010. 
 
2. Financial Releases 
Keeping in view the complexity of project and weak implementation capacity 
of the executing agencies, project faced severe problems. Hiring of consultants and 
procurement was delayed mainly because of weak capacity of management’s to 
understand project design as well as unstructured implementation mechanisms. Poor 
inventory management of the procured equipment because of lack of trained staff to use 
them. Consultants/contractors also perform unsatisfactory due to weak management 
credentials. Only 24.8 percent disbursement (4.0 m out of 16.152m) could be made 
against elapsed loan period of 78 percent. Remaining amount of 12.2 million, 
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equivalent to 75% of the original loan amount, was cancelled, as expected that project 
may not accomplish its objectives. Therefore, disbursement targets could not be 
achieved due to slow physical progress.  
 
3. Bank Review Mission  
Both ADB and Government agreed on the need of the project but discrepancies 
in definition of project scope in the ADB project document (RRP) and government (PC-
I), confusion about the implementation arrangements persisted during project life cycle. 
Given the weak implementation capacity of the executing and implementing agencies to 
recruit consultants to design and introduce reforms, ADB made no serious effort to 
work with the project staff to mitigate problems. High turnover of project officers 
administering the project at ADB also added towards issues. ADB’s internal project 
performance monitoring system did not trigger any danger signs until late 2007 ― 
letting project slip initially to ‘at risk’ rating, and finally to early closure. 
ADB and Government had to conduct two joint semi-annual reviews (including 
at least one full review) of the project every year. ADB missions were, however, fielded 
only once a year from 2006. The heightened security risk in 2009 and UN security 
recommendations also restricted missions to the project area. Both ADB and 
government performance was rated ‘partly satisfactory’ in PCR. 
 
4. Overall Performance 
The project was rated ‘unsuccessful’ as it achieved only 26 percent of the 
physical progress, presenting poor contract award and disbursement performance. The 
wide gap between the time elapsed and the physical progress was due to complex 
project design; overambitious and unrealistic nature of interventions; unfamiliarity of 
the executing and implementing agencies with ADB guidelines and procedures 
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(procurement guidelines were violated seriously); lack of coordination between 
executing and implementing agencies; discrepancies between ADB’s project document 
(RRP) and government’s project document PC-I; overdesign of civil works structures 
and unrealistic cost estimates; and frequent changes in project teams at ADB and 
resultant delays in approval.  
 
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
Support for the TEVT subsector was in line with ADB’s country strategy and 
Government of Pakistan’s PRSP. ADB and government expected different outcomes 
from the project. Government was interested in strengthening its TEVT network by 
improving infrastructure and equipment, while ADB was more concerned with policy 
reforms, curriculum, and management of TEVT institutions. Sensing disagreement, it 
was decided to terminate the loan agreement. 
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CASE STUDY-III 
Project (Loan No.)  NWFP Barani Area Development (1787) 
Location 
Kohat, Karak, Abbottabad, Haripur, Batagram, Mansehra, Kohistan, Bannu and 
Lakki Marwat, and Orakzai Agency of FATA 
Thematic Area Sustainable Livelihood 
Sponsoring Agency Planning & Development Department, NWFP 
Implementing Agency 
District line Agencies of Works & Services,  
Irrigation, Agriculture, and Forest & NGO’s 
Objectives/Outcomes 
It aims to reduce poverty in remote areas of NWFP, particularly among small land 
holders and landless peoples, to improve the status of women in the traditionally 
conservative areas where access to opportunities have been limited. 
Mode of Financing  Asian Development Fund        
Terms & Conditions 
Repayment Grace Period Interest 
32 yrs 8 yrs 1% p.a during GP & 1.5% thereafter 
 
  
Milestone Dates 
Board Approval Signing Effectivity Closing  Account Closing  
28-11-2000 28-02-2001 
14-06-2001 
12-09-2001 
04-02-2002 
31-12-2008 30-06-2010 
 
Net Loan Amount US$ 45.010 million 
Financial Releases  
(US$ Million) 
Principal Amount Cancelled Disbursement  
60.533 15.523 45.010 
 
Profile of Disbursement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues  
– Project start-up delays of 14 months [Nov 2000 – Feb 2002] 
– Poor administrative arrangements 
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Discussion on Project ‘NWFP Barani Area Development’ (1787) 
 
1. Milestone Dates 
Project was designed for implementation period of almost 7 years (Jan 2002 to 
Dec 2008). The project suffered from start-up delays of 14 months from board approval 
to loan effectiveness (Nov 2000 to Feb 2002) because of delayed approval of PC-I 
document by the government. Establishment of offices and project accounts, and 
recruitment of staff were completed in May 2003. The project became fully operational 
in 2004, but due to earthquake in 2005 and its aftermath, project slipped its 
implementation plan whereas almost all project activities were completed on 31 
December 2008. The loan was closed on 30 June 2010 due to some accounts 
resettlement issues.  
 
2. Financial Releases 
Disbursement was initially slow in the first 4 years (2002–05), but raised in the 
last 3 years (2006–08). Simple loan effectivity and disbursement conditions as well as 
retroactive financing facility helped successful completion of the project. Project 
achieved 75% of its disbursement targets ($45 million out of $ 60 million) whereas 25% 
of the loan was cancelled as one of the projects’ component ‘Rural Financial Services’ 
could not be launched due to lack of institutional capacity and high service delivery cost. 
The initial disbursement was made about 18 months after loan approval, and the final 
disbursement was made on 31 March 2010, 15 months late due to delayed submission 
of final claims by the EA. Poor administrative arrangements, and slower project 
implementation effected disbursement negatively. ADB also took on average 2.3 
months processing time of withdrawal application, as imprest account and the 
statement-of-expenditure procedure were used for payments.  
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3. Bank Review Mission  
To ensure project activities are on track, ADB carried out eight review missions, 
trained EA staff in disbursement and procurement guidelines, revised the civil works 
design standards, and strengthened the project offices. ADB’s overall performance 
seem satisfactory but EA expressed displeasure over delays in disbursements due to 
systemic problems faced, no loan extension policy by Bank show lack of commitment 
to stand-alone community development projects. PCR rated executing agency 
performance ‘highly satisfactory’ whereas ADB performance was rated ‘satisfactory’. 
 
4. Overall Performance 
The project completed 80 percent of the estimated cost surpassing appraised 
targets for all components except rural financial services component ($17.5 million) 
which was not implemented due to lack of implementing capacity of the EA. The 
project’s compliance with key social, financial, environmental, economic, and other 
implementation-related conditions was satisfactory. Simple loan effectivity and 
disbursement conditions and responsiveness to security crises and natural disasters 
helped successful project completion. 
 
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
Both primary and secondary objectives of the project, poverty reduction; 
gender and development were consistent with ADB’s Country Partnership Strategy and 
Government’s commitments on gender equality and rural development. Project impact 
showed that most appraised activities were relevant and helped increase agriculture 
productivity, water-use efficiency, and access to services. Most of the appraisal targets 
were generally accomplished or surpassed.  
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CASE STUDY-IV  
Project (Loan No.)  Sindh Road Sector Development Project (1892-Pak) 
Location Sindh Province 
Thematic Area Roads & Highways 
Sponsoring Agency Communication & Works Department, Government of Sindh 
Implementing Agency Works & Services Department, Government of Sindh 
Objectives/ Outcomes 
 Improvement of provincial highways;  
 Improvement and rehabilitation of rural access roads; and 
 Implementation of the Poverty Reduction Pilot Program. 
Mode of Financing   Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR)     
Terms & Conditions 
Repayment Grace Period Interest 
15 yrs 3 yrs Libor based 
 
  
Milestone Dates 
Board Approval Signing Effectivity Closing  Revised Closing  
19-12-2001 01-02-2002 01-05-2002 
25-09-2002 
30-6-2007 30-06-2009 
16-07-2010 
 
Net Loan Amount US$ 63.044 million 
Financial Releases  
(US$ Million) 
Principal Amount Cancelled Disbursement  
89.080 26.036 63.044 
 
Profile of Disbursement 
 
 
Issues  
– Inadequate capacity of executing agency to implement project 
– Lack of interest and commitment at part of Government 
– Slow decision making process 
– Slow disbursement initially 
– Overly optimistic schedules.  
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Discussion on Project ‘Sindh Road Sector Development’ (1892) 
 
1. Milestone Dates 
The project was initially planned for five years (June 02- June 07). Loan was 
declared effective after seven months of loan signing on part of delayed approval of PC-
I by the government. Major activities were targeted to be completed by Dec 2006 but 
project authority had inadequate capacities and available resources in terms of project 
readiness, commitment to resolve major issue. Project was scheduled overly optimistic 
and completion periods for important milestones were inadequate. Despite its 
extensions for three years, not all components could achieve complete progress.  
 
2. Financial Releases 
At project completion, $63.044 million out of total $89.080 million was 
disbursed. Project disbursement delays attributed to currency exchange rate variations - 
the value of ADB loan becomes $179 million which was $150 million at time of 
appraisal. Other delays include procurement delays, late deployment of project staff and 
contractors and consultants, delays in processing withdrawal applications, processing of 
the loan extension request. Therefore, amount of $ 26 million was cancelled as civil 
works of provincial highways could not utilize its targeted amount ($26m out of total 
$56m). Even after two years of project extension, disbursement targets could not be met.  
3. Bank Review Mission 
ADB fielded nine review missions during implementation and completion 
stages provide valuable suggestions to PMU on project planning, resolution of issues, 
social and environmental safeguards etc. As the matter of fact these interventions were 
made on the later stages then earlier - could be more effective if provided on the early 
stages of project. PMU rated ADB’s performance ‘partly satisfactory’ due to frequent 
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changes in its administration staff and delayed disbursements and procurements. ADB 
allowed three years loan extension and minor changes in scope to accelerate progress 
and improve results.  
4. Overall Performance 
Rated ‘partly satisfactory’ due to its heavy reliance on consulting services and 
poor performance of the consultants; some of its objectives were undermined. Related 
issues include late mobilization of consultants, lack of interest among prequalified 
contractors in the bidding process, delayed procurement of civil work contracts—
mainly because of poor preparation and long review processes, contractual and legal 
issues raised by some of the contractors; and impractical unit rates resulting from long 
implementation delays and high inflation. 
Main weaknesses of the project arose from insufficient ownership and lack of 
commitment from Government. Essential assumptions for success for institutional 
development and capacity building include strong commitment, consistency, dedicated 
resources, and continued encouragement for behavioral change. But inadequate staffing, 
long decision making procedures at critical stages, implementation delays and lack of 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism contributed towards poor performance.  
   
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
Road transport sector is considered as backbone of economic development in 
rural areas. Therefore project was relevant with GoP’s economic growth and poverty 
reduction strategy and consistent with the needs of national infrastructure development 
priorities. ADB prioritized the investment according to it Country Partnership Strategy 
to help improve rural network of roads.  
It was assumed that Govt. of Sindh has sufficient experience and adequate 
resources to implement this project successfully. But low outputs of the project and 
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implementation delays throughout the project period concluded that government was 
not ready for implementation of the project with true commitment and enthusiasm. 
Lack of interest and commitment as well as slow decision making was obvious during 
the entire implementation period.   
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CASE STUDY-V   
Project (Loan No.)  Punjab Road Development Sector (1928) 
Location Punjab Province 
Thematic Area Economic growth 
Sponsoring Agency Communication and Works Department, Government of Punjab 
Implementing Agency Communication and Works Department, Government of Punjab 
Objectives/ Outcomes 
(i) improving the rural access road network, increasing access to markets and 
social services for rural populations, and reducing rural poverty; (ii) improving 
important provincial highways to facilitate trade and provide better income and 
employment opportunities; (iii) supporting organizational reforms and institutional 
strengthening of the Punjab Communication and Works Department (CWD), 
including devolution and expansion of e-governance; (iv) preserving road 
infrastructure and improving assets management by increasing the planning and 
budgeting capacity at the CWD; (v) improving the process of road maintenance, 
creating a provincial road maintenance funding mechanism; and (vi) increasing 
private sector participation in road infrastructure development and maintenance. 
Mode of Financing    Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR)        
Terms & Conditions 
Repayment Grace Period Interest 
15 yrs 3 yrs Libor based 
 
  
Milestone Dates 
Board Approval Signing Effectivity Closing  Account Closing  
31-10-2002 31-01-2003 26-03-2003 
31-04-2003 
26-06-2003 31-12-2008 02-09-2009 
 
Net Loan Amount US$ 82.838 million 
Financial Releases  
(US$ Million) 
Principal Amount Cancelled Disbursement  
185.757 102.919 82.838 
 
 
Profile of Disbursement 
 
 
 
Issues  
– Procurement delays, late hiring of consultants/contractors 
– Lack of ownership, interest and commitment 
– Inefficient staffing and reduced scope of the project. 
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Discussion on Project ‘Punjab Road Development Sector’ (1928) 
 
1. Milestone Dates 
The project was planned for five years (June 03 – Dec 08). It faced initial 
delays of 8 months from board approval to effectiveness because late establishment and 
mobilization of Project Engineering Cell (PEC). On project completion not much of the 
progress was achieved due to various factors contributing slow progress such as delayed 
hiring of consultants and procurement of civil works, insufficient staffing and 
government of Punjab’s lack of commitment in implementing the project. Though 
project activities were not completed but project closed on its original closing date (Dec 
2008) due to non-extension policy of Bank and Government. Loan account closing took 
place 9 months later then physical activities were completed.  
2. Financial Releases 
On completion project utilized $82.838 million of project funds out of 
$185.757 million estimated at appraisal. The difference (56% of the original loan) was 
either through variations in the foreign currency exchange rate, or due to the reduced 
scope of the Project. Due to Government of Punjab’s lack of commitment and poor 
implementing capacity of project authorities, two main components ‘institutional 
reform’ and ‘capacity building component’ were dropped. Provincial Road component 
and Rural Access Road component could utilize 42% and 30.5% of the total cost 
respectively. The disbursement delays were mainly because of procurement delays; late 
hiring of contractors and consultants; and slow processing of withdrawal applications. 
 
3. Bank Review Mission  
ADB performance was rated ‘partly successful’ as some delays in the 
processing of procurement and disbursements were observed quite often. ADB fielded 
eleven review missions including two project completion missions, offered critical 
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recommendations; advised on planning, procurement, construction management, 
environmental mitigation measures, resettlement polices, and resolution of technical 
issues. The performance of monitoring team was not satisfactory as they did not keep 
track of project activities diligently. The issues project faced since beginning could have 
been rectified if ADB had intervened earlier.  
 
4. Overall Performance 
With reduced scope, the projected outcomes have partly been achieved. The 
initiative of institutional development support, capacity building, and institutional 
reforms subcomponents achieved minimal results and were less effective. Prolonged 
land acquisition issues, financing and materials shortfalls, and poor monitoring and 
evaluation reports. PEC, consultants and the contractors had limited capacities. Project 
also faced difficulties in retaining experienced staff due to low wages in high risk 
security situations. The main weaknesses of the Project arose from the Government of 
Punjab's lack of ownership, commitment and readiness. Decision making and approval 
delays by the government added to further implementation delays. Given all constraints 
and optimistic project schedule, progress remained behind during the entire period of 
implementation. 
 
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
The project investment was consistent with the sectoral priorities of the 
Government as Vision 2030 considers road infrastructure improvement as a key strategy 
for accelerating trade and economic growth. ADB Country Partnership Strategy also 
emphasizes the need of infrastructure and its improvement. The Project design was 
successful as its objectives, performance indicators, and targeted outputs were realistic. 
Even with reduced scope of the project these all objectives were somewhat achieved in 
consistency with national road transportation needs and development priorities.
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5.2 Discussion on Key Findings23  
The case study on the sample projects have analyzed five core indicators to 
measure progress against each project i.e. achieving key milestone dates, financial 
releases, special review missions by the Bank, the overall project performance, and 
relevance of project design with government’s and ADB’s development strategies. The 
result against each indicator is as follows:- 
1. Achieving Milestones dates 
Achieving key milestone such as approval, singing, effectivity and closing dates 
faced serious delays. All projects suffer from initial delays (start-up delays) i.e. loan 
1928 and 2133 face two month delays in singing and effectivity respectively; seven 
months in signing (loan 1892) whereas loan 1787 (14 months) and 1900 (2 years) also 
faced serious delays at early stage of the project. Initially slipped project milestones 
dates further lead towards implementation delays and at the end seeking extensions in 
loan closing (2133 – one year; 1900 – 2 years; 1892 – 3 years) to complete physical 
activities whereas loans 1928 and 1787 faced 9 months and 18 months delays 
respectively in closing of loan account due to resettlement issues between Bank and 
PMU. The reasons associated for such delays include delayed approval of project PC-I 
documents mainly because of delayed inter-ministerial approvals; establishment of 
PMU and recruitment of competent key staff; inadequate capacity of project authorities 
in terms of project readiness and commitment during implementation.   
 
2. Financial Releases 
Project disbursements were slow due to various reason associated to each project. 
As most of the projects were initially slipped, physical activities were difficult to 
                                           
23 Detailed results – stylized causes against each project and its reason are presented at Annex-VI.   
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maintain with the targeted as well as the financial releases. Out of five sample projects 
two projects 1892 and 1787 achieve 70% and 75% of the disbursement targets 
respectively.  The other three sample projects could not even achieve half of its 
disbursement mainly because of delayed establishment of PMU (1900 – 18.8%), slow 
physical progress due to inability of project authorities to understand project design 
(2133 – 24.8%) delayed hiring of consultants/contractors to implement project (1928 – 
44.5%) and inadequate institutional capacity to implement, major components were 
dropped (1787; 1928). Projected and actual disbursement profile against each project is 
presented at annex-V.  
A more serious problem was the cancellation of a substantial proportion of the 
original loan amount due in particular to the lack of commitment and ownership of the 
projects or some components of the projects. For some projects the cancelled loan 
amount reached more than 70%-80% of the original loan amount. For those cancelled 
amount the government of Pakistan had paid commitment fees to the ADB until the date 
of cancellation.  
 
3. Bank Review Mission 
Analysis shows that projects which were reviewed properly by the Bank through 
review missions had better performance than others. If disbursement targets are taken as 
physical progress, the two projects 1787 and 1892 having highest disbursements among 
all projects were reviewed eight and nine times respectively during its implementation. 
Bank also provided valuable suggestion to PMU on project planning and resolutions of 
issues (1928). These missions were helpful in resolving the critical issues in timely 
manner as well as achieving important milestones. The remaining two projects of 
Health and education sector suffered because only one loan review mission was fielded 
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(1900) and no serious effort was made to work with project staff to resolve project 
related inefficiencies (2133) and finally the project faced advance closure. 
 
4. Overall Performance 
According to project completion report only one project 1787 was rated as 
‘successful’ - reviewed eight times and achieved 75% of its disbursement targets. Two 
projects 1928 and 1892 were rated ‘partly successful’ whereas the other two projects 
1900 and 2133 were rated ‘unsuccessful’. Some of the indistinguishable reasons for the 
unsuccessful projects include highly structured project design, over ambitious and 
unrealistic project interventions, partly relevant designs as per government institutional 
capacities to implement, lack of qualified staff for PMU, lack of coordination between 
multiple stakeholders, unfamiliarity of executing and implementing agencies with ADB 
guidelines and procedures, long decision making procedures and inter ministerial 
approvals (PC-I), poor monitoring mechanism, and insufficient ownership and 
commitment by government. 
 
5. Relevance of Design and Formulation 
All the projects were in line with ADB and government priorities, but problems 
associated with each lead to certain failures. Lack of institutional and implementing 
capacity of the government and implementing agencies (1900), difference expected 
outcomes by ADB and government (2133), lack of government interest and 
commitment (1892). Two of the projects (1787 and 1928) had comparatively better 
performance due to realistic project design; achievable objectives, and key performance 
indicators and milestones, projects could accomplish appraisal targets.  
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Chapter VI       Conclusions 
 
 
 
The present study describes foreign aid implications theoretically as well as a 
case study analysis of ADB-financed projects in Pakistan. The study also highlighted 
the causes for implementation delays on project performance and analyses its effects on 
foreign aid efficacy.  
6.1 Summary of Results  
 
The project performance was analyzed with the help of sample case studies of 
ADB-financed projects. It was observed in most of the cases, issues affecting project 
performance are identical. Some of the important characteristics include project start-up 
delays (long time taken for approval of PC-I by the government and meeting of 
effectivity conditions), weak institutional capacity of the project authorities and 
government, coordination problems among stakeholders, unrealistic project 
interventions, unstructured implementation mechanism, poor administrative 
arrangements with deficient qualified staffing, and lack of ownership, interest and 
commitment on government part.  As per our hypothesis, ADB-financed projects 
suffered from three types of implementation delays: due to poor preparation and 
planning, lack ownership and commitment, and lack of institutional capacities. Whether 
case study analysis confirms the hypothesis or not, the details against each type of delay 
as well as its associated causes are discussed below:- 
The results of case study analysis confirm the hypothesis that project lacks 
good planning and preparation before the project take-up. All projects have suffered 
from the the initial delays ranging from the period of two months (1928) to two years 
(1900) in loan signing and effectivity mainly because of delayed approval of project 
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PC-I document by the government - delayed inter ministerial approvals and 
establishment of PMU and hiring of key staff to run the project. These prolonged initial 
delays make project authorities to seek for project extensions for no less than two 
(1900) to three (1892) years. Despite essential project interventions in key sectors, poor 
administration and implementation does not produce the desired results. First of all in 
the very start of a project, delayed approval of PC-I clearly indicates that government 
lacks proper coordination to achieve project’s critical milestone targets. Secondly, 
failure to meet project effectivity conditions such as establishment of project 
management unit and installation of important project staff shows governments lack of 
commitment to implement its development agenda.  
 
There is lack of institutional capacity to work out project activities and ensure 
project requirements at federal and provincial levels. One of the reasons is either PMU 
does not have enough management capacity (1900, 1787) in terms of qualified 
personnel or the given human resource is not capable of understanding and 
implementing project requirements (2133, 1892). Heavy reliance on consultancy 
services and inability to hire consultants on time, lacking required credentials, and poor 
monitoring of the consultant performance produce terrible results. Inadequate capacity 
in terms of project readiness and commitment (1892) to resolve major issues and much 
higher expectations of the project interventions than the institutional realities of the 
agencies (2133, 1900) make a project difficult to implement. After project realization, 
important interventions of the project were dropped because of poor institutional 
capacity. In two projects 25% (1787) and 65% (1928) of the total loan amount was 
cancelled due to inability of the implementing agencies to implement ‘institutional 
reform’ one of the important project component. Poor administrative arrangements, 
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monitoring and evaluation mechanism and slow decision making process at critical 
stages produce poor results.  
The imperative cause associated to all the project related issues was identified 
after case study analysis. Given the plenty of resources (funds), lack of institutional 
capacity or ‘absorptive capacity’ of executing and implementing agencies is a due 
hurdle in achieving desired project results. Such institutional capacity can be associated 
to procedural delays at critical stages, weak coordination among stakeholders, poor 
commitment/interest or ownership by government and project readiness, over ambitious 
project design, weak monitoring mechanism and accountability by political authorities 
and management. Detail of each issue highlighted, its underlying problem, 
stakeholder’s opinion and researcher’s recommendation for future policy implications 
are given below. 
 
6.2 Findings and Recommendations 
 
ADB financed projects in Pakistan faced issue of inadequate preparation and 
planning at the initial and very crucial stage of the project management cycle. The real 
problem exists during the preparation of project document (PC-I) by the line ministries, 
its timely completion and its approval from the competent authority. It was observed 
that the issue of ensuring the timelines has an extreme importance given the foreign 
aided nature of the projects. All five case studies undertaken have faced start-up delays 
and lately requested for loan extensions (once or twice) at the end to complete physical 
activities of the project. One of the reasons to this delay could be the difference in the 
financial calendars to implement project activities between government and donor as 
well some decision making or approval delays at government part. 
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To evade this, projects with complete design and feasibility study should be 
approved in the current budget. The Project document PC-I should comprise of a 
complete and concise roadmap or timelines for all the activities should be prepared at 
the start of the project and meet accordingly with rigorous monitoring processes to 
complete the physical activities on time. The same should be approved by the 
competent authority right before or after the project is approved by the ADB Board, so 
that project signing could be take place within specified period. Other effectivity 
conditions such as establishment of project management unit and availability of 
counterpart funds should be made. This will help not only avoid interest charges by the 
donor but also to achieve the development objectives of that project.  
Another common issue, i.e., lack of interest and ownership from the 
government agencies also hampers the project performance. Project initiation and 
implementation is done by the different program authorities. This discontinuity of 
process between initiators and implementers at times make it really difficult to visualize 
the project design and its outputs. To resolve this issue, the project director and some 
other staff should be hired by the ministry who could largely be involved during the 
project design, formulation of the project and coordinate with the relevant stakeholders.  
Poor management capacity is important factor effecting performance in almost 
all project case studies. Projects lack qualified professionals, who do not understand the 
project requirements. Organizational inability to hire consultants on time, poor 
performance of consultant due to lack of monitoring and accountability, poor 
administration and inability to implement project vigorously. To tackle this issue, 
project authorities should hire people with desired qualifications or in other case build 
individual capacities in the field of project management for effective implementation of 
the project. To retain project staff, incentives should be given for good performance and 
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penalties for poor performers. Government should collaborate with international donors 
for implementing institutional reform process, and seek more of technical assistance for 
building the institutional capacities of the government project authorities.  
The study highlighted the drawbacks of donor driven project designs ultimately 
lead to project failures. Two projects were badly affected due to the over ambitious 
project design without realizing the practical realities of the existing culture. Out of 67 
ADB projects feasibility study of almost 97% of the projects were done by the 
international consultants who cannot accurately identify the local culture specific 
aspects. It was noticed that all feasibility studies (PC-II Performa) are filled in with the 
information provided by the donors - no local wisdom or need analysis is taken into 
consideration. As a matter of fact, designs from local engineers and consultants are 
more practical and implementable then those of international.  
Government agencies should focus on enhancing the expertise in developing 
and designing the project feasibility documents. Both donor and government should be 
involved in designing projects with direct input from the project beneficiaries. In the 
present set up of the public sector executing and implementing agencies development of 
project document - a specific expertise is rare or non-existent. There is need to build the 
capacity of involved government officials and improve their understanding on project 
processes. 
Lastly, the reality which could not be disregarded is bureaucratic delays, and 
political constraints and interferences that halt the development process. Extensive time 
taken in the decision making at various stages of project implementation makes it 
difficult to meet deadlines. Though few but politically favored projects make it difficult 
to design a framework that operates on the standard practices for all projects. A third 
party monitoring firm should be hired to oversee the project progress and ensure 
 61 
 
projects objectives are achieved at the maximum.  
It can be concluded that most of the ADB projects face initial delays, lack of 
proper coordination and inter-ministerial approval delays and poor absorptive capacity 
to undertake and implement projects. Critical millstones are ignored due to poor 
institutional capacity of the executing agencies which are essential for keeping the 
project performance on track. For successful project implementation and to utilize aid 
effectively, government need to minimize such delays and enhance the institutional 
capacity of the concerned agencies involved in project management.   
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Appendices 
 
Annexure-I: ADB wide Portfolio Performance Quality Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Pakistan comparison with South Asian countries  ($ million) 
Country (no. of loans) Pakistan (31) India (67) Bhutan (25) Nepal (16) Bangladesh (56) 
Year 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Contract 
Awards/Commitments 
1,178.9 833.3 1,657.1 1,856.0 75.6 8.9 94 98.0 1,209.4 458.1 
Disbursements 1,093.3 799.1 1,339.8 1,699.0 31.0 41.5 73.5 80.1 1,068.0 469.1 
Loans at Risk (%) 21.4 19.4 5.7 4.5 16 0 5.9 0 0 3.6 
Project success rate 1990, 
2000 
58 24 64 60 83 100 60 40 72.34 100 
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Central and West Asia                                              ($ million) 
Country (no. of loans) Pakistan (31) Kazakhstan (05) Tajikistan (07) Armenia (05) Uzbekistan (20) 
Year 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Contract 
Awards/Commitments 
1,178.9 833.3 700.5 122.5 40.5 2.8 117 22.7 137.8 149 
Disbursements 1,093.3 799.1 542.5 90.3 67.1 37.8 119.9 22.3 125.9 81.8 
Loans at Risk (%) 21.4 19.4 0 0 0 14.3 - - - 0.5 
Project success rate 
1990, 2000 
58 24 71.43 33.33 66.67 100 100 100 50 55.5 
                               Central and South East Asia                                        ($ million) 
Country (no. of loans) Pakistan (31)  Indonesia (30) Vietnam (55) Philippines (11) Cambodia (21) 
Year 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Contract 
Awards/Commitments 
1,178.9 833.3 721.9 890.8 1782 610 1314.1 13.1 30.8 44.3 
Disbursements 1,093.3 799.1 732.7 965.8 1093.4 406.7 1317.5 31.1 61.1 53.5 
Loans at Risk (%) 21.4 19.4 10 10 2.3 7.3 0 0 6.3 0 
Project success rate 
1990, 2000 
58 24 62.65 71.43 92 100 44.68 72.73 91.67 81.82 
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Annexure-II : MEDIUM AND LONG TERM LOANS 2005 - 2010 
 
Donor 2005 2010 
   i) MULTILATERAL  15,671 23,750 
      ADB 6,313 11,586 
      IBRD 2,238 1,722 
      IDA 6,865 9,777 
Other 255 664 
     EIB 20 59 
     IDB 56 377 
     IFAD 126 186 
     NORD. DEV. FUND 16 14 
     NORD. I. BANK 15 7 
     OPEC FUND 22 22 
     ii) BILATERAL  13,273 16,470 
          a) Paris Club Countries  12,473 13,959 
                 AUSTRIA 68 60 
                 BELGIUM 68 31 
                 CANADA 480 516 
                 FINLAND 6 6 
                 FRANCE 1897 2,011 
                 GERMANY 1617 1,660 
                 ITALY 216 98 
                JAPAN 5,233 7,011 
                KOREA 661 471 
                NETHERLANDS 107 106 
                NORWAY 42 19 
                RUSSIA 130 120 
                SPAIN 83 79 
                SWEDEN 156 151 
                SWITZERLAND 84 103 
                UNITED KINGDOM 14 9 
                UNITED STATES 1,611 1,507 
          b) Non Paris Club Countries  800 2,511 
                 CHINA 607 1,762 
                 KUWAIT 79 104 
                 LIBYA 5 4 
                 SAUDI ARABIA 43 519 
                 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 66 121 
 Grand Total (i) + (ii) 28,944 40,220 
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Annexure-III : Procedures/Processes during Project Identification and Preparation 
 
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
 
Project Identification 
 
Project Profile in Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
 
Pre Project Profile Technical Assistance (PPTA) Fact Finding 
 
Preparation for PPTA 
 
First Internal Review - Staff Review Committee (SRC) 
 
PPTA Approval 
 
Consultants Contracts 
 
Project Preparation 
 
Inception Mission 
 
Feasibility Study & Design Report 
 
Consultative Meeting 
 
First Draft Report and Recommendation of the President (RRP) 
 
Regional and Sustainable Development Department (RSDD) - Compliance 
Memo 
 
First Internal Review - Management Review Meeting (MRM) 
 
Draft RRP and Comments on Loan Documents 
 
Appraisal Mission 
 
Second Internal Review (SRC) 
 
Second Draft RRP/ Loan Document 
 
Loan Negotiation 
 
Board Circulation 
 
Loan Signing 
 
Loan Effectiveness 
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Government of Pakistan (GOP) 
 
Project Identification 
Budget Allocation for PC-II (feasibility study) Concept clearance by Executing 
Agency  
 
Circulate Country Partnership Strategy to EA for project Preparation 
 
Nomination of Planning team by Executing Agency 
 
Draft Feasibility Study (PC-II) 
 
PC-II approval by PDWP/CDWP and Establishment of PMU and appointment of 
staff 
 
Technical Assistance Paper Signing 
 
GoP Concurrence 
 
Project Preparation 
Participation of PMU staff in Inception Mission 
 
Comments by Government/PMU 
 
Participation by Government/PMU 
 
First Draft PC-I 
 
Departmental Review of PC-I 
 
Planning & Development Department Comments Pre-PDWP 
 
Comment of PDWP on draft PC-I 
 
Revised PC-I, joint review of project and clearance, LARP & ESP, consultant 
selection, civil works/goods procurement methods with the aide memoire. 
 
PDWP Approval 
 
Pre-CDWP (Planning Commission’s Comments) 
 
CDWP Approval of PC-I and Concept Clearance by ECNEC 
 
ECNEC Approval 
 
Loan Signing 
Project Staff in place & establishment of acceptable procedures. 
 
 
PDWP/CDWP: Provincial/Central Development Working Parties 
PMU: Project Management Unit 
ESP: Environmental Safeguards Plan 
LARP: Land Acquisition & Resettlement Plan 
ECNEC: Executive Committee of the National Economic Council 
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Annexure-IV : Project Commitments and Disbursement Profile 1999-2010 (Graph) 
 
Amounts in Thousands USD 
Sr. 
No. Loan No Loan Title 
Sector       
(% total) 
Principal 
Amount Cancelled 
Net 
Loan 
%age 
Disb 
1 1671(SF) Women's Health 
Health (9%) 
48,957 9,671 39,286 80 
2 1900(SF) Reproductive Health 44,072 38,394 5,678 13 
3 1916(SF) Decentralized Elementary Education Education 
(14%) 
85,772 76,938 8,834 10 
4 2133(SF) Restructuring Education 16,152 12,105 4,047 25 
5 2135(SF) Restructuring TEVT 11,229 9,292 1,937 17 
6 1672(SF) Malakand Rural Development Agri & Rural 
Sector Dev 
(14%) 
47,554 21,851 25,703 54 
7 1787(SF) NWFP-Barani Project2 60,533 15,523 45,010 74 
8 1934(SF) Sindh Rural Development 57,125 55,046 2,079 4 
9 1679(SF) Punjab Irrigation Irrigation (4.3%) 7,795 7,795 0 0 
10 1988 (OCR) 
Rural Finance Sector 
Project 
Finance 
Sector 
Development 
(4.4%) 
25,000 18,438 6,562 26 
11 2067(SF) SME Sect Dev Project SME Dev (4.3%) 18,637 12,720 5,917 32 
12 2060(SF) Southern Punjab Urban Services  
Urban Sector 
Development 
(18%) 
48,767 24,282 24,485 50 
13 2061 (OCR) 
Southern Punjab Urban 
Services 48,833 23,492 25,341 52 
14 2211 (OCR) Rawalpindi Environment 20,000 8,526 11,474 57 
15 2212(SF) Rawalpindi Environment 43,183 40,955 2,228 5 
16 2210(SF) NHDP-Project 1 
Road 
Transport 
(32%) 
3,276 2,599 677 21 
17 1892 (OCR) 
Sindh Road Sector Dev 
Project 89,080 26,036 63,044 71 
18 1893(SF) Sindh Road Sector Dev Project 90,272 29,480 60,792 67 
19 1928 (OCR) 
Punjab Road 
Development 185,757 102,919 82,838 45 
20 2104(SF) NWFP Road Dev 5,192 2,904 2,288 44 
21 2231 (OCR) 
National Highway Dev 
Proj 180,000 56,883 123,117 68 
22 2401(SF) National Trade Corridors Proj 9,980 9,980 0 0 
 GRAND TOTAL  1,147,166 605,829 541,337 47 
 
Note:-   
 
SF: Loans from Asian Development Fund for social sector (soft loans) 
OCR: Loan from Ordinary capital resources (hard terms) 
 73 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph: Project Performance, Commitments and Disbursement 1999-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Author calculation based on ADB, LFIS database 
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Annexure-V: Projected and Actual Disbursement Profile of Projects 
 
US$ Millions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Loan No. 2133 
Projected Disb Actual Disb 
2004 0.000 0.000 
2005 0.400 0.600 
2006 0.300 0.229 
2007 1.700 1.729 
2008 2.750 1.586 
2009 0.250 0.041 
2010 0.000 0.102 
2011 0.000 0.000 
 
Year 
Loan No. 1787 
Projected Disb Actual Disb 
2000 0.0 0.0 
2001 0.0 0.0 
2002 0.2 0.5 
2003 1.7 0 .068 
2004 6.5 3.5 
2005 6.0 5.3 
2006 7.0 8.7 
2007 8.0 12.9 
2008 16.0 14.0 
2009 2.5 0.0 
2010 0.0 0.2 
 
Year 
Loan No. 1900 
Projected Disb Actual Disb 
2001 0.000 0.000 
2002 0.000 0.000 
2003 0.000 0.000 
2004 0.500 0.000 
2005 1.000 2.493 
2006 3.000 2.534 
2007 3.000 2.252 
2008 1.500 -0.052 
2009 0.000 -1.549 
 
Year 
Loan No. 1892 
Projected Disb Actual Disb 
2001 0.0 0.0 
2002 2.5 0.8 
2003 0.0 0.3 
2004 6.7 2.0 
2005 14.0 8.6 
2006 20.0 18.5 
2007 20.0 28.1 
2008 40.0 48.2 
2009 18.0 16.8 
   
 
Year 
Loan No. 1928 
Projected Disb Actual Disb 
2002 0.00 0.00 
2003 0.00 1.63 
2004 3.00 0.42 
2005 10.74 1.04 
2006 10.30 6.33 
2007 14.00 12.14 
2008 43.70 46.94 
2009 6.00 14.34 
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Annexure-VI : Stylized Causes against each project and its reason 
 
 
Sr. 
No.  
Delays/  
Sectors  
Achievement of Milestones 
dates  Financial Releases  Review Mission (Bank)  Overall Performance  Relevance  
1.  Health  (1900)  
- delayed loan signing and 
effectiveness  
- loan extended twice  
- only $8.44m (18.8%) out 
of $45m estimated  
- slow disb. in the first 3 
years (6% against an 
elapsed period of 62%)  
- one loan review 
mission in February 
2005  
- achieved 30% of its physical 
targets only 
- relevant to PRSP of 
Government as well as 
ADB’s CPS.  
 Reason  
- Inability of EA to secure 
govt approval  
- PCU, PIU was established 
after two years of loan effect  
- late establishment of 
PCU, PIU (after 2 yrs)  -  
- performance eroded due to its 
highly structured, complex 
design, with ambitious and 
unrealistic targets  
-  
2.  Education  (2133)  
- delayed loan effectiveness 
and advance closure  
- only achieved 24% of 
disbursement targets (4.0 m 
out of 16.152 million)  
- once a year from 2006; 
no mission was fielded 
in 2009  
- 26 percent of the physical 
progress achieved against 
projected.  
- relevant with CPS and 
PRSP but project design was 
partly relevant.  
 - Govt. wanted to improve 
infrastructure and equipment, 
while ADB was more 
concerned with policy 
reforms.  
 Reason  
- late approval of PC-1 by  
government  
- slow and unsatisfactory 
physical progress  
- lack of physical progress 
of the project.  
- security risk at project 
areas in 2009.  
- lack of coordination among 
stakeholder 
- discrepancies btw RRP & PC-I  
- frequent changes in project 
teams at ADB  
- limited capacity of 
government to implement 
such project.  
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3.  
Agri  
& Rural 
   
(1787) 
- 14 months delay for loan 
effectiveness  
- project accounts, and 
recruitment of staff 
completed after 1.4 years of 
effectivity  
loan account closure after 
1.5 yrs of project completion  
- out of total amount 75% 
of the disbursement was 
achieved.  
- initially slow in the first 4 
years (2002–2005), but 
picked up in the last 3 years 
(2006–2008)  
- ADB ensured 
compliance with loan 
conditions and 
conducted eight review 
missions  
- project completed 80% of the 
estimated cost and surpassed 
appraised targets except rural 
financial services component.  
- consistent with CPS as well 
as the government’s 
commitments on gender 
equality and its strategies for 
rural development and 
agriculture sectors.  
 Reason  
- delayed approval of PC-1 
by  government 
- account resettlement issues  
- late establishment of 
PMU, and project accounts, 
and recruitment of staff     
4.  
Road 
 Transport 
(1982)  
- loan effectivity after seven 
months of loan signing  
- loan extended for two 
years  
- out of 89.080 $ million, 
63.044 $ million (70%) was 
disbursed. 
- nine review missions 
and one project 
completion mission  
- frequent changes in 
ADB administration 
staff  
- rated partly satisfactory due to 
its heavy reliance on consulting 
services, some of its objectives 
were undermine.  
- objectives were consistent 
with the needs of national 
infrastructure development 
priorities in the province as 
well as ADB’s thematic 
objectives.  
 Reason 
- inadequate capacities of 
project authority in 
commitment to resolve 
major issues  
- late deployment of project 
staff, construction delays, 
withdrawal applications 
processing time 
 
- lack of coordination and 
communications among various 
stakeholders  
- long decision making 
procedures, and lack of 
monitoring mechanism  
- government was not ready 
for implementation of the 
project with true 
commitment.  
5.  (1928)  
- No start-up delays  
- No extension policy by 
Bank and government  
- accounted for 37.3% of 
the total project cost, at 
project completion verses 
67.5% estimated.  
- eleven review 
missions and two 
project completion 
missions  
- limited progress was achieved 
and projected outcomes partly 
achieved  
- consistent with the sectoral 
priorities of the govt, Vision 
2030 as well as ADB’s CPS.  
 Reason   
- difference was either due 
to foreign currency 
variations, or reduced scope 
of the Project  
 
- Government of Punjab's 
insufficient ownership of and lack 
of commitment   
 
